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Establishing the Standard for a Physician's Patient 
Diagnosis Using Scientific Evidence: Dealing with the 
Split of Authority Amongst the Circuit Courts of Appeal 
Jack E. Karns • 
Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the 
other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly. The scientific 
project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging consideration of a mul-
titude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect will eventually be 
shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In any trial where an expert's opinion or other scientific evidence is 
relied upon to establish causation, serious questions are raised as to the 
standard that should be applied by the court when deciding questions of 
admissibility. 2 In no area is this problem more acute than in the health-
care field where patients afflicted with various and sundry maladies at-
tempt to prove that a particular company is responsible, and they want to 
do so by the introduction of scientific evidence and expert testimony, 
especially that of physicians.3 The federal courts have not been a model 
of clarity with regard to this issue, and there now exists a singular split 
among the federal circuits that may have to be resolved by the Supreme 
Court.4 
* Copyright © 2000 by Jack E. Karns, Professor of Business Law, East Carolina Univer-
sity, Greenville, NC. S.J.D. (Candidate) (Health Law and Policy), 2001, Loyola University Chicago; 
LL.M. (Taxation), 1992, Georgetown University; J.D., 1981, Tulane University; M.P.A., M.S., 
1974, B.A., 1973, Syracuse University. 
I. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,597 (1993). 
2. This issue has been garnering considerable coverage recently in the press. See, e.g., John 
R. Henderson eta!., How "Reliable" Should a Physician's Diagnosis Be?, NAT'L. L.J., May 29, 
2000, at Bl8; June D. Bell, Gauging an Expert's Expertise, NAT'L. L.J., July 24, 2000, at AlO (cov-
ering Utah state cases); and William C. Smith, No Escape from Science, A.B.A. J., August 2000, at 
60. 
3. In the American Bar Association Journal article, the author stated, "Scientific and techni-
cal issues have infiltrated nearly every comer of legal practice. Lawyers who thought they might 
avoid the esoteric rigors of science and technology simply by sidestepping a few fields like medical 
malpractice and patent law have come in for a rude awakening." Smith, supra note 2, at 60. 
4. See infra Sections III, IV, and V. 
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Although the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. 5 case provides the starting point for evaluating this issue, subsequent 
case law and application thereof has diverged from the general gatekeep-
ing function originally envisioned by this precedent. 6 Through its gate-
keeping function, Daubert intended that trial courts test the reliability 
and relevance of the scientific evidence, not that it be put to the scrutiny 
by members of the appropriate professional community.7 However, with 
the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE or the "Rules"), the 
Daubert approach was emboldened as the Rules required that a certain 
flexibility be maintained with regard to the admission of all evidence. 8 
The theory underlying this approach was that the trier of fact should not 
be deprived of relevant evidence, was capable of discerning levels of 
relevancy vis a vis causation, and finally, that opponents could rely on 
cross-examination to expose weaknesses in any evidence, scientific or 
otherwise.9 
5. 509 U.S. at 579. 
6. The Daubert Court utilized Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in conjunction with its concept 
of the "gatekeeping" function at the trial court level to explain the role of judges in rendering deci-
sions regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence. Essentially, the Court found that any evi-
dence or testimony that assisted the trier of fact in rendering a decision or understanding a fact at 
issue should be admitted pursuant to the gatekeeping function. Most importantly, the Court distin-
guished this role by pointing to the issue of relevancy and its criticality in the decision process. ld. at 
591. 
7. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. The Court clarified its position: 
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at 
the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scien-
tific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in is-
sue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology un-
derlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or 
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. We are confident that federal 
judges possess the capacity to undertake this review. Many factors will bear on the in-
quiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test. 
!d. (footnotes omitted). 
8. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence the controlling case precedent re-
garding expert opinion and scientific evidence was Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923). 
In accordance with the foregoing, the Daubert Court responded, "Because we hold that 
Frye has been superseded and base the discussion that follows on the content of the congressionally 
enacted Federal Rules of Evidence, we do not address petitioners' argument that application of the 
Frye rule in this diversity case, as the application of a judge-made rule affecting substantive rights, 
would violate the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 n.6 (citation omit-
ted). "That the Frye test was displaced by the Federal Rules of Evidence does not mean, however, 
that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor 
is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial 
judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence is not only relevant, but reliable." 
!d. at 589. 
9. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. The Court was most adamant in its confidence regard-
ing the use of cross-examination to weed out weak evidence: 
Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on 
the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but ad-
missible evidence. Additionally, in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of 
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In recent cases, this flexibility approach was tested by proponents 
who demanded that a physician's differential diagnosis be supported by 
scientific studies and peer reviews, as is customary in the scientific 
community. The Third and Fourth Circuits, and more recently the Utah 
Supreme Court, chose to hold that such studies are not required for ad-
missibility purposes under the FRE or Daubert. 10 The contra position 
was taken by the Fifth Circuit, which now requires hard scientific backup 
before a physician's differential diagnosis can be admitted. 11 The conflict 
presented here is the subject of this article. 
Following a discussion of the Daubert case and its attendant re-
quirements, the various Circuit cases will be discussed as to the efficacy 
of both approaches.12 Two Utah Supreme Court cases will receive par-
ticular attention and prominence as they are the first to be promulgated 
by the highest court of any state on this issue. 13 Finally, the author will 
offer comments and rationale supporting the more flexible approach re-
garding admissibility of physician diagnoses that is supported by the ma-
jority of state and federal courts and which stands opposed presently only 
by the Fifth Circuit. 14 
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S POSITION-THE DAUBERT CASE 
In Daubert15 the Supreme Court accepted, on certiorari, an appeal 
from a Ninth Circuit case16 regarding the question of how reliable a phy-
sician's diagnosis had to be in order to escape any negligence claims.17 
Specifically, as Justice Blackmun put it in his opinion, the Court was 
called upon to determine the standard that would be used for "admitting 
expert scientific testimony in a federal trial."18 In this case, the petition-
evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to 
conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the court remains free to direct a 
judgment, and likewise to grant summary judgment. ... These conventional devices, 
rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising 'general acceptance' test, are 
the appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony meets the standards of 
Rule 702. 
/d. at 596 (footnotes, citations, and commentary omitted). 
10. Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999); Westberry v. Gislaved 
Gummi A.B., 178 F. 3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999); State v. Kelley, I P.3d 546 (Utah 2000); State v. Adams, 
5 P.3d 642 (Utah 2000). 
II. Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) cert. denied 526 U.S. 
1064; Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1999). 
12. See infra Sections III and IV. 
13. See infra Section V. 
14. See infra Section VI. 
15. 509 U.S. at 579. 
16. See id. 
17. See id. 
18. /d. at 582. 
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ers, Jason Daubert and Eric Sure, were minor children who had been 
born with serious birth defects. 19 The petitioners filed suit in California 
state court alleging that the birth defects had been caused by the mother's 
ingestion of Benedictin, a prescription drug marketed by the defendant 
and prescribed to the plaintiff for nausea.20 Prior to any argument, the 
case was removed to federal court on diversity grounds.21 The district 
court granted Merrell Dow's motion for summary judgment, holding that 
the scientific evidence upon which the plaintiff relied was not suffi-
ciently established in order to have any sort of general acceptance in the 
medical field. 22 The district court later concluded that Daubert had not 
met the standard set forth in United States v. Killgus. 23 
Benedictin had been tested thoroughly, and there was a vast body of 
epidemiological data which tended to support Merrell Dow's argu-
ments. 24 Another important factor raised by the district court was the fact 
that the live animal studies on which the petitioners relied could not be 
reasonably used by a jury in terms of deciding the issue of causation.25 
Also, with regard to the mountain of published studies that had been 
submitted and which had found no causal connection between the drug 
and any birth defect, the court ruled that these were not admissible since 
they had neither been published nor subjected to any sort of outside peer 
. 26 
revrew. 
Following extensive discovery, Merrell Dow filed for summary 
judgment based on the contention that Benedictin did not cause birth de-
fects in humans and that the plaintiff could not produce any scientific 
evidence that would be admissible at trial. 27 In what became the battle of 
the expert witnesses, Merrell Dow put Steven Lamm, a physician epide-
miologist, on the stand to testify about a number of published articles 
that essentially found that Benedictin was not a substance capable of cre-
ating any type of malformations in fetuses.28 Based upon his extensive 
review of the literature and his professional opinion, Dr. Lamm con-
cluded that Benedictin was not a cause of human birth defects, even if 
taken during the first trimester of pregnancy.29 
19. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582. 
20. Seeid. 
21. See id. 
22. See id. at 583. 
23. See id. 
24. Seeid. 
25. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 584. 
26. Seeid. 
27. See id. at 582. 
28. See id. 
29. See id. 
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The Court was particularly taken with the fact that the briefs that had 
been filed in the case by both parties did not include the general types of 
information, statutory language, or case law that was customarily submit-
ted. 30 The briefs dealt with definitions of "scientific knowledge, scientific 
method, scientific validity and peer review-in short, matters far from 
the expertise of judges."31 Clearly, the Court was not as comfortable with 
these briefs as it would have been had they included the traditional statu-
tory and case precedent material. This made the Court's decision making 
process more difficult because since it had to base its decision on the 
"expert" observations provided in the briefs and the conflicting testi-
mony provided by the expert witnesses.32 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and stated 
that any sort of medical or expert opinion had to be based on a scientific 
technique that was "generally accepted as reliable within the relevant 
scientific community."33 The appellate court stated that the expert opin-
ions that had been offered diverged significantly from recognized au-
thorities in the field and could not be "generally accepted as a reliable 
technique" so as to meet the admissibility standards.34 The Ninth Circuit 
noted that other circuits refused to admit epidemiological studies that had 
not been published or subjected to peer review. Since the entire scientific 
community had no opportunity to view the material and offer its opinion, 
the strictures of the Federal Rules of Evidence were not met.35 The Su-
preme Court subsequently concurred by noting that the issue of admissi-
bility for scientific data rested on the reanalysis by the scientific commu-
nity, thereby upholding its veracity relative to the issue of causation?6 
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the petitioners had not satisfied their 
causation burden at trial, and that they had laid an insufficient basis for 
the admission of their expert testimony that Benedictin was the cause of 
their children's deformities.37 The United States Supreme Court recog-
nized the division among the Circuits and granted certiorari to resolve 
the conflict. 38 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing the Frye v. 
United States39 case and stating that the "general acceptance" test that 
30. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 599. 
31. !d. at 599. 
32. See id. 
33. /d. at 584. 
34. /d. 
35. See id. 
36. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-98. 
37. See id. at 585. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. 
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was the result of Frye had become the accepted standard regarding ad-
missibility of "novel scientific evidence at trial."40 The Court observed 
that the rule had been standing for seven decades and that it was fol-
lowed by the Ninth Circuit.41 The key language of the rule is that which 
refers to the deduction having to be made sufficiently so as to gain gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.42 This decision 
became the long accepted rule for admissibility of scientific evidence, 
even though the Frye opinion had its origin in a brief 1923 decision 
which contained no legal citations.43 
Daubert argued that the Frye test, whatever that test might be, was 
superseded when the FRE were adopted.44 The Supreme Court agreed 
with this argument and began with an analysis of Rule 402 which pro-
vides the baseline for any analysis for the admissibility of relevant evi-
dence.45 Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible, but this must 
be read in concert with Rule 401 which provides that evidence becomes 
relevant whenever it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence."46 Forgetting for 
a moment about the difficulties in deciding whether or not scientific evi-
dence is relevant or admissible, it is granted that the FRE went to great 
lengths to incorporate as much admissible evidence as possible. 
Other Federal Rules of Evidence that are of importance in this par-
ticular case include Rule 702 which has to do with expert testimony and 
which provides: "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact and issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise."47 It should be noted that the term "general accep-
tance" is not necessarily included in this particular rule and that there is 
no connection which ties rules 401 and 402 together relative to the types 
of evidence which have to be available in order to be admissible to prove 
causation. Consequently, given the drafting of the FRE and the decision 
in the Frye case, the Supreme Court concluded that a rigid construction 
of the "general acceptance" requirement would be contradictory to the 
liberal tendencies of the FRE to relax the less stringent requirements on 
40. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585. 
41. See id. at 585-86. 
42. See id. 
43. See id. 
44. See id. at 587. 
45. See id. 
46. !d. at 587. 
47. /d. at 588. 
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opinion testimony .48 At the time Frye was decided, it was the exclusive 
test for admitting scientific testimony and was an "austere standard" 
when compared with the more current FRE.49 
Just as the Court accepted the FREas superseding the Frye general 
acceptance test, it also stated that there were limitations on the admissi-
bility of purportedly scientific evidence if the trial judge was in any way 
not able to screen the evidence or was precluded from insuring that the 
evidence was reliable.50 Obviously, the connection here is with Rule 702 
and the role that the expert plays in validating any type of scientific study 
for the court and jury to use in making its determination. As the Court 
pointed out, the word "scientific" engenders in the public a feeling that 
there have been procedures of some type acceptable in the world of sci-
ence that, although the public does not understand them, legitimize the 
study.51 
The purpose of expert testimony is to assist the trier of fact to reach a 
conclusion, and, in the Daubert case, that conclusion was related to the 
key issue of causation. It appears that two of the things the court may 
look to are the scientific methodology used in studies (i.e., can a theory 
or technique be tested, and has empirical testing been applied to the data 
involved?) and the peer review and publication aspect that results from 
the aforementioned studies.52 But, as the Daubert Court said, this is not 
the "sine qua non of admissibility"53 since it does not necessarily estab-
lish the reliability of the scientific evidence in question. 54 Many proposi-
tions have been put forward in trial without the proper testing only to 
find out that some component of science was overlooked or that the sci-
entist involved was too enthusiastic as to his or her results. This results in 
substantive laws in methodology, and the court must be ever mindful of 
the fact that when this occurs it is the job of the judge to ensure that this 
type of evidence is excluded. 55 
The Court was particularly concerned about the pessimism of 
Merrell Dow regarding the ability of the jury and the judge, in general, 
through cross-examination and careful examination of the evidence, to 
render an appropriate result.56 Although scientific conclusions may be 
subject to a perpetual revision, law has to be resolved finally and it must 
48. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. 
49. See id. at 589. 
50. See id. 
51. See id. at 590. 
52. See id. at 593. 
53. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
54. See id. 
55. See id. at 595. 
56. See id. at 595-96. 
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be resolved quickly. In other words, there is no such thing as the legal 
scientific process.57 The Court also noted that the primary role for the 
judge is the gatekeeping role-to ensure that the aforementioned rules of 
evidence and scientific validity are not violated when evidence is admit-
ted into trial and that the evidence is submitted to a vigorous cross-
examination to insure that the jury is provided a good look at both sides 
of the case. 58 A judge can always exclude evidence under FRE 403 if he 
or she believes that the probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the unfair prejudice that it would create by misleading the jury.59 Finally, 
the Court stated that the "general acceptance" test is not necessarily a 
precondition to admissibility of evidence in the FRE and that there are 
other foundations based on scientific principles that will satisfy these 
demands.60 Since the district court and Ninth Circuit focused on the gen-
eral acceptance test as enunciated in Frye, the Supreme Court vacated the 
judgment of the appellate court and remanded the case for further pro-
d. 61 cee mgs. 
Ill. THE FIFfH CIRCUIT 
In 1998 and 1999, four cases were decided by various United States 
courts of appeal which have now created a split among the circuits on the 
causation factor when expert testimony is involved.62 The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals decided the following two cases. 
A. Black v. Food Lion, Inc. 
In Black v. Food Lion, lnc.,63 Maxine Black was shopping at a Food 
Lion store in Grand Prairie, Texas when she slipped and fell on the resi-
due of a broken mayonnaise jar that had been dropped by a stock boy. 
Although the stock boy cleaned up the contents of the spill with paper 
towels and the cleanup was approved by the store manager, Ms. Black 
fell on the spot and filed this action.64 The case was removed to federal 
court by the defendant. The plaintiff recovered nearly $300,000 in dam-
ages because she was able to establish a diagnosis of fibromyalgia syn-
57. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97. 
58. See id. at 589 n.7, 597, 599. 
59. See id. at 595. 
60. See /d. at 589, 597. 
61. See id. at 598. 
62. See Black, 171 F.3d at 308; Moore, 151 F.3d at 269; Heller, 167 F.3d at 146; Westberry, 
178 F. 3d at 257. 
63. 171 F.3d at 309. 
64. See id. 
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drome.65 The court described it as an elusive but debilitating affliction. 
A large part of Ms. Black's case was de£endent upon the expert witness 
and evidence that she put on the stand. 6 The Fifth Circuit reversed the 
award, concluding that Ms. Black had not adequately established her 
case by the production of reliable scientific expert evidence or wit-
nesses.67 
Some background is necessary to understand the test which was used 
by the Fifth Circuit in reaching this particular decision. While in the 
store, Ms. Black slipped on the mayonnaise film on the floor while es-
corting her daughter to the restroom.68 At that time, she complained of 
pains in her lower back and arm, a headache, and dizziness.69 The injury 
was immediately reported to the Food Lion management, and Ms. Black 
sought medical attention.70 Ms. Black's physician was Dr. James Polli-
frone, who conducted tests and physical therapy but was unable to iden-
tify any physical basis for Ms. Black's continued complaints of pain.71 
He prescribed a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) test, an EMG, and 
a battery of other tests that he would do for any patient for whom a diag-
nosis was difficult to reach.72 On May 11, 1994, he referred Ms. Black to 
Dr. Mary Reyna, a physician certified by the American Board of Physi-
cal Medicine and Rehabilitation and by the American Board of Pain 
Medicine, and holding a specialty in persistent and chronic pain treat-
ment.73 
After a short time Dr. Reyna diagnosed Ms. Black with fibromyalgia 
syndrome. 74 This syndrome is characterized by generalized pain, poor 
sleep, an inability to concentrate, and chronic fatigue. Although it is most 
common in women between the ages of 30 and 40 and is associated gen-
erally with hormonal problems, Dr. Reyna's hypothesis was that the fall 
caused the physical trauma that resulted in hormonal changes which pre-
cipitated Ms. Black's condition.75 
After the case was removed to federal court, the court conducted a 
bench trial.76 Food Lion, of course, argued that it was not negligent and 
65. See Black, 171 F.3d at 309. 
66. See id. 
67. See id. 
68. See id. 
69. See id. 
70. See id. 
71. See Black,171 F.3d at 309. 
72. See id. 
73. See id. 
74. See id. 
75. See id .. 
76. Seeid. 
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that the action it had taken had been reasonable relative to the danger 
presented and to the duty and breach of said duty, which had occurred 
with the spilling and breaking of the mayonnaise jar in the store's aisle.77 
Food Lion, more importantly, argued that the scientific evidence which 
Ms. Black offered was insufficient to support her contention that she suf-
fered from this unusual disease. In a nutshell, Food Lion's defense "was 
the contention that Dr. Reyna's testimony could not causally link the fall 
at Food Lion with Black's present medical condition with any degree of 
medical certainty."78 The trial court rejected Food Lion's arguments and 
did allow Dr. Reyna to testify over its objections, ultimately awarding 
judgment to Ms. Black.79 
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the factual findings for clear error and 
conclusions of law. The court pointed out that Food Lion did not engage 
in an extensive defense regarding the issue of negligence since it felt that 
its conduct had risen to the level of an adequate negligence defense.80 
The real contention focused on the extent of Ms. Black's damages re-
garding the relationship of her fall to the onset of fibromyalgia. 81 
The court pointed out that, under Texas law, Ms. Black's burden of 
proof required her to prove that, pursuant to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty based on medical probability and scientifically reliable 
evidence, the fall at Food Lion directly caused her claimed injury.82 All 
she presented at trial was Dr. Reyna's testimony, which resulted from the 
several weeks of treatment before the trial began.83 The magistrate judge 
allowed Dr. Reyna to testify as an expert witness notwithstanding Food 
Lion's challenge pursuant to Rule 702 and, most importantly, pursuant to 
Daubert.84 Although the majority did not specifically tie its decision to 
the scientific reliability standard set out in Daubert, it did make some in-
teresting remarks which bear on understanding this ruling. 
The judge stated that "the court looks to the trial testimony presented 
by Dr. Reyna as well as that of other medical experts whose testimony 
was presented by deposition."85 Despite the elusiveness which appeared 
in an absolute determination of causality via testimony of the specialists 
in the field, their conflicting testimony had to be recognized because they 
all followed proper protocol in rendering an opinion in terms of reason-
77. See Black,171 F. 3d at 309. 
78. /d. 
79. See id. at 309-310. 
80. See id. at 310. 
81. See id. 
82. See id. 
83. See id. at 309. 
84. See id. at 310. 
85. /d. 
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able medical probability.86 It does appear that Dr. Reyna followed this 
particular protocol in basing her presentation of testimony in court on 
this evidence.87 
The Black court was particularly taken that the district court did not 
even mention the Daubert case. This raised serious reservations regard-
ing the intellectual rigor that had been used to determine Ms. Black's 
medical condition.88 Because of this, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the 
magistrate judge had abused his discretion in admitting Dr. Reyna's tes-
timony.89 To justify this conclusion, the court held that experts had rec-
ognized that there is an insufficient amount of evidence to establish that a 
particular trauma causes fibromyalgia.90 The appellate court also listed 
the Daubert factors that should be used in order to establish scientific va-
lidity or reliability when judging the validity of any expert's testimony.91 
The court's conclusion was that Dr. Reyna's theory did not pass 
muster with regard to meeting these tests. More to the point, it stated that 
Dr. Reyna's conclusion was more conjecture than science and was not 
deduced from "scientifically validated information."92 Considerable time 
was spent noting that the scientific literature states that Dr. Reyna's the-
ory has not gained acceptance in the medical profession. Resident ex-
perts throughout the field conclude that the ultimate cause of fibromyal-
gia cannot be known and that it is only an educated estimate that can be 
made by a physician based on the patient's history. To quote the Fifth 
Circuit, "[m]ere conjecture does not satisfy the standard for general ac-
ceptance, except to demonstrate general acceptance of a proposition con-
trary to Dr. Reyna's. Finally, Dr. Reyna's theory of causation, which has 
been verified or generally accepted, also has no known potential rate of 
error."
93 
Since the exact causes of fibromyalgia are not known, there can be 
no way to prove in a court of law what scientific evidence would be suf-
ficient to show causation of this disease by any particular type of trau-
matic action such as that which occurred in this particular case. The court 
negated Dr. Reyna's testimony and held that Food Lion was not liable 
for any medical expenses, lost wages, pain, or suffering that were attrib-
utable to her diagnosis of fibromyalgia by the physician. She could only 
86. See Black, 171 F. 3d at 310. 
87. See id. at 310-12. See, e.g., Moore, 151 F.3d at 269 and Kuhmo Tire Company, Ltd. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
88. See Black, 171 F. 3d at 312. 
89. Seeid. at312-14. 
90. See id. at 312. 
91. See id. at 311. See also Kuhmo Tire Company, Ltd., 526 U.S. at 137. 
92. /d.Black,I7IF.3dat313. 
93. /d. 
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be compensated for expenses that occurred as a direct result of the slip 
and fall relative to the mayonnaise residue on the floor. 94 
B. Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc. 
Another important case decided in the Fifth Circuit in 1999 was 
Moore v. Ashland,95 which was essentially a toxic tort action filed against 
a chemical manufacturer. In this particular case, the key issue was 
whether the court abused its discretion by excluding the opinion of a par-
ticular physician. The doctor would have testified as to the causal rela-
tionship between the plaintiff's exposure to the industrial chemicals and 
his pulmonary illness.96 The court did not find any abuse of discretion 
and affirmed the lower court's decision.97 
Bob Moore worked for Consolidated Freightways, a company which 
contracted freight deliveries for a variety of companies. On the morning 
of April 23, 1990, Moore delivered several containers of chemicals that 
had been manufactured by Dow Coming Corporation to the Ashland 
Chemical, Inc. terminal in Houston.98 When he opened the back door of 
the trailer, a pungent chemical smell caused him to suspect that one of 
the containers had started to leak.99 The Ashland Chemical Manager, 
Bart Graves, along with Moore, identified the two leaking containers and 
removed them from the trailer as soon as possible. Graves contacted 
Dow and requested instructions as to how the cleanup should proceed as 
well as a copy of the material safety data sheet (MSDS) for spilled 
chemicals.100 The MSDS for these particular containers showed exactly 
what was in them along with the health hazards associated with their 
contents. 101 The MSDS noted that Toluene was the most hazardous of the 
ingredients contained in the drums and warned that depending upon ex-
posure to fumes, various organs such as lungs could be seriously dam-
aged.102 
In accordance with the cleanup instructions, Moore and Graves put 
the leaking containers into larger salvage drums. Then Moore and an-
other Consolidated Freightways employee placed absorbent material on 
the spilled chemicals inside the Freightways trailer and swept them up. 
94. See id. at 314-15. 
95. Moore, 151 F.3d at 269. 
96. See id. at 271. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. 
99. See id. 
100. See id. 
101. See id. 
102. See id. at 272. 
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This cleanup period exposed the two men to the pungent fumes for ap-
proximately forty-five minutes to an hour. 103 Following the cleanup, 
Moore went back to the Consolidated terminal from which he had begun 
his travel. At trial, he testified that about an hour after finishing the 
cleanup he began to feel symptoms of dizziness, watery eyes, and diffi-
culty breathing.104 Even though Moore was experiencing these physical 
difficulties, he was able to deliver one more trailer as requested by his 
supervisor. At the end of his final delivery, Moore returned to the termi-
nal and told his supervisor that he was sick. The supervisor sent Moore to 
the company doctor, and the next day Moore went to see his family phy-
stctan.105 
Following two to three weeks of treatment by his family physician, 
Moore was placed under the care of a pulmonary specialist, Dr. Simi. Dr. 
Simi released Moore to return to work on June 11, 1990, but after work-
ing several days, Moore terminated his employment due to difficulty 
breathing. 106 During the summer of 1990, on three separate occasions, he 
consulted Dr. Daniel E. Jenkins, another pulmonary specialist, and Dr. 
Jenkins diagnosed his condition as a "Reactive Airways Disfunction 
Syndrome" (RADS). This is an asthmatic type condition. 107 In November 
1990, Moore sought out the advice of another pulmonary specialist, Dr. 
B. Antonio Alverez, who became his primary treating physician and who 
also confirmed Dr. Jenkins's diagnosis and treated Moore for RADS. 108 
Moore told his physicians that he was a smoker, that he had consumed 
approximately one pack of cigarettes a day for approximately twenty 
years, and that he was smoking at the time of the trial. He further re-
ported that on April 23, 1990, when he was exposed to the Dow chemi-
cal, he had just returned to work following an absence from work with 
pneumonia. The evidence provided by Moore's childhood treating physi-
cian established that Moore had a related history of childhood asthma. 109 
Moore and his wife filed suit against Ashland Chemical, Inc. and 
others based on the grounds that Ashland was negligent in insisting that 
Moore expose himself to the vapors that had been created by the spillage 
of the leaking drums. To be more specific, Moore argued that Ashland's 
employee, Bart Graves, did not have the authority to enlist Moore's sup-
port in cleaning up the spillage problem and should have permitted 
103. See Moore. 151 F.3d at 272. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. 
108. See id. 
109. See id. 
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Moore to return to Consolidated's terminal or had other Ashland em-
ployees clean up the spill. no Finally, Moore argued that Graves did not 
permit him to use a respirator during the cleanup and that this contributed 
to the gravity of his physical problem. Following removal to federal 
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the case moved toward trial. 111 
After extensive motion arguments regarding whether or not expert 
physicians should be permitted to testify, the case proceeded to trial be-
fore a jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the district court entered a take 
nothing judgment against Moore. Moore then appealed the decision to 
the Fifth Circuit, which concluded that the district court had made an er-
ror in not allowing Dr. Jenkins, one of Moore's expert witnesses, to give 
an opinion regarding the cause of Moore's illness. 112 The divided Fifth 
Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a 
new trial. 113 An en bane rehearing was granted to clarify the standards 
that the district court should have applied in determining whether to ad-
. . Jl4 Illlt expert testimony. 
In this particular appeal, the Circuit focused on the trial court's re-
fusal to permit Dr. Daniel Jenkins to give an opinion on the cause of 
Moore's illness. It is necessary to understand some additional factual and 
procedural information and background in order to completely appreciate 
the arguments of both parties in this particular case. Moore wanted to 
call two medical witnesses, Dr. Jenkins and Dr. Alverez. Dr. Jenkins was 
a well qualified medical specialist who was board certified by the 
American Board of Internal Medicine. 115 Dr. Jenkins also had special 
training and had taught in the fields of pulmonary disease, allergy, and 
environmental medicine. He had seen Moore on three occasions, exam-
ined him, performed a variety of tests, and reviewed Moore's medical 
records. His final conclusion was that Moore suffered from RADS and, 
based upon his examination and tests, expressed the opinion that 
Moore's RADS had been caused by the exposure to vapors from the 
chemical spill at the Ashland facility in April of 1990. n6 Dr. Jenkins re-
lied heavily on the MSDS in reaching this decision and conducted tests 
to determine the close connection between Moore's exposure to the 
Toluene solution and the symptoms which he exhibited after exposure to 
h 'II n 7 t e sp1 age. 
110. See Moore, 151 F.3d at 272. 
Ill. See id. 
112. See id. 
113. See id. 
114. See id. at 272-73. 
115. See id. at 273. 
116. See id. 
117. See id. 
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Dr. Alverez was a former student of Dr. Jenkins and agreed with Dr. 
Jenkins about the cause of Moore's RADS disease. He was Moore's pri-
mary treating physician and, in addition to the reasons relied on by Dr. 
Jenkins, he supported his theory of causation with a report of a study on 
RADS co-authored by Dr. Stewart Brooks that he found in a medical 
magazine. 118 It is important to note that when Dr. Jenkins was initially 
being deposed he stated that he did not know of any reported literature 
that supported his causation opinion and that his knowledge of the medi-
cal report was made known to him outside the presence of the jury. 119 
Perhaps the most important thing that Dr. Jenkins admitted at trial 
was the fact that Moore was his first RADS patient who had had an ex-
posure to Toluene and that he had never conducted any research on this 
particular subject. Although Dr. Jenkins had previously treated other pa-
tients whose RADS he attributed to exposure to chemicals that he knew 
were known to irritate the airways, he did concede that the chemicals in-
volved with the previous patients were stronger and probably more irri-
tating than those to which Bob Moore had been exposed. 120 The district 
court reviewed Dr. Jenkins's deposition, listened to his testimony, and 
decided to exclude his causation opinion. Although the court did permit 
Dr. Jenkins to testify about his examination of Moore, the tests that he 
had conducted as well as his diagnosis, the court excluded his opinion 
because his exposure to the causation of RADS by Toluene in patients 
like Bob Moore was limited. 121 
The district court decided that Dr. Jenkins had no scientific basis for 
this opinion and that it would be inconsistent with Rule 702 of the FRE, 
not to mention the court's gatekeeper rule under Daubert, to admit this 
particular opinion.122 The court then allowed Dr. Alverez's scientific ex-
pert opinion even though it was essentially the same as Dr. Jenkins's be-
cause he had relied on the Brooks study and had also been Moore's treat-
ing physician throughout most of this particular time period. 123 Ashland's 
chemical expert, Dr. Robert Jones, made his review from medical re-
cords and the overall medical history of Bob Moore and concluded that 
he did not have RADS. He concluded that Moore suffered from a form of 
bronchial asthma and that the Toluene did not cause his pulmonary prob-
lems. He believed that Bob Moore's history as a heavy smoker for about 
twenty years, history as an asthmatic, and his bout with pneumonia al-
118. See Moore, 151 F.3d at 273. 
119. See id. 
120. See id. 
121. See id. 
122. See id. 
123. See id. at 274. 
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lowed a trained physician to rule out RADS as a possible causation in-
. h I 124 Jury tot e ungs. 
Given this background, the key issue here was the exclusion of Dr. 
Jenkins's causation testimony and the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the 
Supreme Court's resolution of the disagreement among circuit courts as 
to the standard for admission of expert witnesses testimony or exclusion 
thereof. The court concluded that Daubert was one of two cases that con-
trolled the analysis in this situation. The Moore court analyzed the fac-
tors looked at by the Daubert Court including admissibility of witnesses, 
the methodology used in the scientific community, the Frye doctrine, and 
the issue that the Federal Rules of Evidence supersede the admissibility 
of scientific evidence as established in the Daubert case. Most impor-
tantly, the Fifth Circuit noted that although the Frye test was displaced 
by the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Rules did place some limits on 
admissibility of scientific evidence. 125 Scientific evidence must be rele-
vant and reliable. It is the judge's responsibility to ensure that any and all 
scientific evidence is admitted as long as the evidence is relevant and re-
liable.126 
The most important thing that the Fifth Circuit did in Moore, 127 as 
well as in Black, 128 was to reiterate the essential element coming from the 
Daubert case that the expert testimony of any scientific witness must be 
buttressed by facts supporting the validity of that scientific evidence. 
That is to say, the evidence must have been tested within the area and 
realm within which that particular type of evidence would have been 
tested. If the scientific evidence were legal we would look to legal schol-
ars for legal documents, legal journal articles, and so on in order to bol-
ster the argument that the conclusion reached by the author had substan-
tial merit in the context of he or she being an expert. 129 In the case of 
scientific or medical evidence, we would look toward articles resulting 
from scientific studies and then published in a medical paper and subject 
to the scrutiny of others in the field who could write contrary or concur-
. . . 130 
rmg opm10ns. 
Remembering that the key question in this particular case was 
whether Dr. Jenkins's opinion should be allowed in the court given that 
he had not stated his knowledge of the Brooks report, but when it was 
124. See Moore, 151 F.3d at 274 .. 
125. See id. at 274-75. 
126. See id. at 276. 
127. See id. at 269. 
128. 171 F.3d at 308. 
129. See Moore, 151 F.3d at 277. 
130. See id. 
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called to his attention by counsel, he did claim to have knowledge of the 
article and stated that he had relied on it. The Fifth Circuit considered the 
issue regarding the admissibility of Dr. Jenkins's testimony in the light of 
a Seventh Circuit decision in which the court stated, "[u]nder the regime 
of Daubert a district judge asked to admit scientific evidence must de-
termine whether the evidence is generally scientific, as distinct from be-
ing unscientific speculation offered by a genuine scientist." 131 
The Fifth Circuit was establishing its preference that expert scientific 
witnesses be able to substantiate their opinions with tests and factors that 
meet the Daubert test. Simply stated, this means that without hard sci-
ence or scientific studies that sometimes go beyond that offered by clini-
cians, this circuit is not inclined to accept the testimony of scientific ex-
pert witnesses absent unusual circumstances.132 "In the end, Dr. Jenkins 
is relegated to his fallback position that any irritant to the lungs could 
cause RADS in a susceptible patient. Dr. Jenkins cited no scientific sup-
port for this theory."133 Finally, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the "analytical gap" 
between Dr. Jenkins's opinion regarding causation and his scientific 
knowledge and data did not support the opinion which he proffered. The 
quote authorized a conclusion under Rule 702 of the FRE that Dr. Jen-
kins's scientific knowledge would not assist the trier of fact in his role as 
. 134 
an expert witness. · 
IV. THE THIRD AND FOURTH CIRCUITS 
In 1999, the Third and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal also decided 
two cases dealing with the issue of expert testimony, but they adopted a 
more flexible approach than that taken by the Fifth Circuit. 
A. The Third Circuit and Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc. 
In Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 135 the Third Circuit faced a situa-
tion where Carol Heller sued Shaw Industries, a carpet manufacturer, and 
claimed that compounds from carpet had caused her to develop a respira-
tory illness. She had one of her experts, Dr. Joseph Papano, her treating 
allergist, testify on her behalf. 136 After an extensive hearing, the district 
court excluded plaintiff's expert testimony and granted Shaw Industries' 
131. /d. at 278 (quoting Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp .• 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
132. See id. 
133. /d. at 279. 
134. See id. 
135. 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999). 
136. See id. at 149-50. 
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motion for summary judgment. The appellate court revisited the case law 
interpreting FRE 702, 401, and 403 and concluded that the district court 
incorrectly excluded some aspects of the proper testimony, yet properly 
excluded the central portions of the testimony that Heller would have 
needed in order to prove her specified claim. 137 Most importantly, as to 
the key issue in this particular article, the Third Circuit held that 
the District Court was too restrictive in requiring Heller's medical ex-
pert to rely on public studies specifically linking Heller's illness with 
Shaw's product, and in requiring Heller's medical expert to rule out all 
alternative possible causes of her illness. However, it properly excluded 
this expert's causation testimony because his conclusion regarding the 
cause of Heller's illness was heavily based on a flawed temporal rela-
tionship between the installation of Shaw Carpet and the presence of 
Heller's illness. 138 
The court also properly excluded the testimony of Heller's environ-
mental expert on the grounds that his environmental testing revealed lev-
els of dangerous compounds in the air in Heller's home that were not 
significantly higher than the background levels in his testing methodol-
ogy.139 Therefore, the grant of summary judgment was affirmed because 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the key ele-
ments with regard to Heller's experts' testimony necessary to prove cau-
sation.140 
The key fact here is that the Third Circuit is in direct contradiction 
with the Fifth Circuit by not agreeing that hard scientific data and studies 
are required before a scientific expert witness' testimony will be ac-
cepted. The Third Circuit's test is more liberal and does not require a rote 
acceptance of the factors set forth in the Daubert case. 141 
On September 30, 1993, Carol Heller, her husband Thomas, and 
their children moved into a nine-year-old home in Westchester, Pennsyl-
vania. Not long after the move, Mr. Heller began experiencing allergy 
symptoms, and a couple of months later he was advised to replace the 
carpeting in the home because cat hair from the previous owner might 
/d. 
137. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 149-50. 
138. /d. 
139. See id. at 150. 
140. See id. 
141. See id. at 155. The court laced its opinion with comments such as the following: 
Given the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the flexible nature of the 
Daubert inquiry, and the proper roles of the judge and the jury in evaluating the ultimate 
credibility of an expert's opinion, we do not believe that a medical expert must always 
cite published studies on general causation in order to reliably conclude that a particular 
object caused a particular illness. 
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have caused this allergic reaction. 142 The new carpeting was installed in 
mid-December by Shaw Industries in various rooms throughout the 
house. In late December 1993, Carol Heller began to experience some 
respiratory difficulties, which included asthma, breathing difficulties, 
some wheezing, coughing, and dizziness. She sought treatment from her 
father, a physician, and then consulted Dr. Joseph Papano, an allergist 
and one of her two expert witnesses. 143 Dr. Papano conducted a full 
medical history, did a number of allergy tests, including chest X-rays and 
pulmonary function tests. 144 Based on these histories and tests, he ruled 
out some of the possible causes of her respiratory difficulties. 145 
In February 1994, she was still experiencing the problems but in-
formed Dr. Papano that her symptoms improved when she was out of the 
house. She also brought the doctor a sample of the Shaw carpet so he 
could sample the odor for himself. 146 Dr. Papano recommended that she 
contact Allen Todd of the Todd Environmental consultants company to 
test the air quality in her home, as well as the carpet, and then to see him 
again after she had the results. Todd tested the carpet twice. First, while 
it was still in the house and the second time in May 1994 after the Hel-
lers had moved out and all of the carpet was removed. At this point, lev-
els of the toxic compound were found to be significantly lower, but none 
of them was the type that would be expected to result in any type of asth-
matic response. The Hellers returned to the house, and Mrs. Heller began 
to experience her shortness of breath and irritating throat problems. In 
November 1994, the Hellers sold the house for less than they had paid 
for it and moved to another location. The Hellers filed suit in district 
court. 147 
The district court specially held a Daubert hearing over several days. 
The key issue was whether or not the scientific evidence gathered on 
both sides would be admissible at trial. 148 The court filed an unpublished 
opinion granting defendants' motions for exclusion of the plaintiff's ex-
pert testimony and for summary judgment. 149 The Third Circuit ulti-
mately concluded that during this process, some of the expert evidence 
for Heller had been incorrectly excluded and should have been allowed 
by the district court. This evidence would have weighed heavily on the 
142. See Heller, 167 F.3d at ISO. 
143. See id. 
144. See id. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. 
147. See Heller, 167 F.3d at !51. 
148. See id. at 151-52. 
149. See id. at 151. 
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causation issue, and the court spent extensive time discussing the issues 
in Daubert as well as a number of other cases. 150 
The Heller court was particularly taken with the Daubert Court's 
comment that there was ample opportunity for vigorous cross-
examination of any evidence that was presented at trial or a motion hear-
ing, even evidence that the opposing side felt was admitted improp-
erly .151 This approach or position would be in line with the Fourth Cir-
cuit's opinion that the Daubert factors were more flexible than viewed 
by the Fifth Circuit in Black and Moore. 152 To state the Third Circuit's 
opinion succinctly, the court noted, "[p]ut differently, an expert opinion 
must be based on reliable methodology, must reliably flow from that 
methodology and the facts at issue-but it need not be so persuasive as to 
meet a party's burden of proof or even necessarily its burden of produc-
tion."153 
The Third Circuit stated that Heller had to demonstrate as a part of 
the prima facie case that Shaw's carpet emitted toxic organic compounds 
that, if inhaled, could cause the injury which she claimed. Certainly, the 
testimony of Todd, a certified industrial hygienist, was integral to prov-
ing one or two of these elements and could bolster any medical conclu-
sion of causation by demonstrating that the compound levels did exist in 
the Heller home and were higher than usual. Without his testimony, 
Heller would not be able to evoke any evidence that there had been or-
ganic compounds in the air at a sufficient level to cause her illness. 
Without that particular evidence having been admitted first, in a subse-
quent trial, any effort to attempt to admit scientific expert evidence 
would be meaningless. 154 The court stated, 
Dr. Papano testified that he also relied on temporal relationships be-
tween Heller's exposure to the Shaw carpet and onset of her symptoms 
as well as information from Todd Environmental Consultants after its 
testing of the Heller home in April and May 1994. Finally, Dr. Papano 
relied on his more than thirty years of experience treating patients with 
allergy related medical problems and his knowledge of environmental 
causes of respiratory problems gained at professional seminars he at-
tended.155 
150. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 151-52. 
151. Seeid.ati52. 
152. See id. 
153. /d. at 152. 
154. See id. at 153. 
155. /d. at 154. 
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Certainly, the lack of published research did not stand in the way of 
the Circuit ruling that FRE 702 had been violated because it was not nec-
essary that published clinical data and medical studies be presented to 
support any testimony from a scientific witness. 156 To quote the court: 
A number of courts, including our own have looked favorably on medi-
cal testimony that relied heavily on a temporal relationship between an 
illness and causal event. . . The temporal relationship will often be 
(only) one factor, and how much weight it provides for the overall de-
termination of whether an expert has 'good grounds' for his or her con-
clusion will differ depending upon the strength of that relationship. 157 
The Third Circuit accepted a less stringent test for admission of scientific 
data. 158 
Ironically, the court agreed with the district court in the Heller case 
that the evidence of Dr. Papano and Todd had been properly excluded 
and that the district court was correct in granting summary judgment and 
withholding the expert testimony. 159 Most importantly though, Heller 
stands for the proposition that the Third Circuit placed itself in direct 
contradiction with the Fifth Circuit with regard to what type of evidence 
would be required in cases involving scientific expert testimony .16° Fi-
nally, it erased any questions as to the necessity for established studies 
subject to clinical review and outside peer review before that evidence 
would be admitted and any particular witness would be allowed to take 
the stand at trial. 161 
B. The Fourth Circuit's Holding in Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi A.B. 
In Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi A.B., 162 Curtis and Connie West-
berry brought an action against Gummi AB (GGAB) claiming that the 
company was liable under South Carolina law for damages they had suf-
fered as a result of the firm's failure to warn of the danger attendant to its 
use of talcum powder on its rubber gaskets. 163 A jury verdict was reached 
in federal court in favor of the Westberrys from which GGAB appealed. 
Mrs. Westberry cross-appealed the refusal of the district court to increase 
156. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 154. 
I 57. /d. (citations omitted). 
158. See id. at 154-55. 
!59. See id. at 158-59, 164-65. 
160. See id. at !55, 165. 
161. See id. at 155-56. The court went to great lengths to reach this conclusion despite its con-
clusion that proffered expert's testimony had been properly excluded by the district court. /d. 
162. Westberry, 178 F.3d at 257. 
163. See id. at 259-60. 
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damages. 164 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court's holding. 165 
GGAB is a manufacturing company that produces rubber products, 
specifically rubber gaskets that are used in window frames. Westberry's 
employer bought some gaskets produced by GGAB to be used in sky-
lights and windows in a South Carolina plant where Westberry worked. 
Because the rubber gaskets were difficult to handle, GGAB applied a 
coating of talcum powder before they were shipped. 166 One of West-
berry's first duties in the receiving plant was to remove the gaskets from 
the boxes and place them in a cutting machine. In his testimony, he ar-
gued that there was a high concentration of airborne talc and that he did 
not receive any warning regarding health dangers. Accordingly, he did 
not wear any protective gear. 167 What followed was an unrelenting series 
of sinus problems that resulted in numerous trips to the hospital and 
treatment by his physician, Dr. W. David Isenhower, Jr. This also in-
cluded some surgeries to alleviate his sinus pain. During these proce-
dures his frontal sinuses were obliterated. 168 Westberry's claim against 
GGAB is quite simple-its failure to warn of the dangers of the gaskets 
coated with talcum powder proximately caused an aggravation of his 
preexisting sinus condition for which aggravation GGAB was liable. 169 
At trial, Westberry introduced his physician as an expert witness to 
provide primary evidence of the causation issue. Obviously, the jury was 
persuaded by Dr. Isenhower since it returned the verdict in Westberry's 
favor. 170 The appeals court looked to FRE 702 regarding the strictures 
that govern the entry of scientific evidence into a trial. 171 It cited Daubert 
and made clear that it was necessary to demonstrate that the expert's 
opinion was reliable and that it was supported by adequate validation in 
order to render it trustworthy. The second part of the scientific evidence 
test required an analysis of the opinion to insure that it was relevant with 
regard to the facts at issue in the case. 172 As the court quoted the Kumho 
Tire Co. case, "an expert's testimony is admissible under rule 702 if it 
rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant."173 
164. See id. at 260. 
165. See Westberry, 178 F.3d at 260 .. 
166. See id. 
167. See id. 
168. See id. 
169. See id. 
170. See id. 
171. See id. 
172. See id. 
173. /d. at 260-61. 
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The appeals court noted the flexibility of the federal rules with re-
gard to the admissibility of expert witness testimony and refused to find 
that Dr. Isenhower's testimony should be inadmissible simply because it 
was not based on "reliable scientific methodology." The mere fact that 
Dr. Isenhower did not have any epidemiological studies or peer review 
publications, where other laboratory data supported the conclusion re-
garding the inhalation of talcum powder causing Westberry's sinus prob-
lems, was not sufficient to bar his testimony. 174 GGAB argued that Dr. 
Isenhower's testimony was nothing more than an opinion and certainly 
not that of an expert. In the words of GGAB, Dr. Isenhower's diagnosis 
was not reliable because he could not "rule in" talc as a possible cause of 
sinus disease. There were no means of accurately assessing the level of 
exposure, and this was absolutely essential in order to establish proxi-
mate cause. 175 
The Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by GGAB 's arguments and 
held that there was plenty of opportunity for any disagreement to be dealt 
with on cross-examination.176 The court believed that Dr. Isenhower had 
demonstrated that he considered and excluded various potential causes 
for Westberry's sinus disease and had ruled them in or out. 177 In this 
fashion, he had reached his conclusion to which he testified at trial. Most 
importantly, the court ruled that any alleged failure of an expert witness 
to rule out all possible alternative causes is not sufficient to prohibit his 
or her expert testimony at trial. In conclusion, the Richmond-based ap-
pellate court rejected GGAB' s arguments and held that "a reliable differ-
ential diagnosis provides a valid basis for an expert opinion on causa-
tion."178 
V. THE UTAH EXPERIENCE 
The issue of admissibility of scientific evidence and medical expert 
testimony has received particularly acute attention recently in the State of 
Utah by virtue of two decisions rendered by the State Supreme Court in 
May 2000. 179 Just as the Daubert Court focused on the term "general ac-
ceptance" of scientific evidence and looked for reliability assessments 
that would allow a differential diagnosis to be allowed or proffered to the 
174. See Westberry, 178 F.3d at 261-63. 
175. See id. at 263. 
176. See id. at 264. 
177. See id. at 264-65. 
178. /d. at 265-66. 
179. See State v. Kelley, I P.3d 546, 549 (Utah 2000); State v. Adams, 5 P.3d 642, 645 (Utah 
2000). Both cases dealt with the admissibility of evidence offered by an expert relative to an indi-
vidual's mental condition. 
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trier of fact under rule FRE 702, the Utah justices were faced with a 
comparable situation. Both of the cases that the court reviewed dealt with 
convictions of individuals originally accused of sexually assaulting 
women who were developmentally disabled. 
A. State v. Adams 
In State v. Adams,180 Nealy W. Adams was convicted of forcible 
sexual abuse, and his conviction was affirmed by the Utah Court of Ap-
peals as well as the State Supreme Court. 181 Adams had developed a per-
sonal relationship with Ms. Virla Hess in 1993 and moved into her house 
which she shared with her thirty-four-year-old daughter Carlene. The 
daughter suffered from Down's Syndrome, could not read or write, and 
had the cognitive skills level of a three-year-old. In 1994 Adams began 
drinking excessively, and his relationship with Ms. Hess began to dete-
riorate. One evening, Ms. Hess awoke when she heard a very load sound 
of breaking glass only to find Mr. Adams leaving Carlene's bedroom 
wearing no clothes. When she spoke with Mr. Adams about the incident, 
he said that he could not remember anything based on the fact that he had 
been very intoxicated. At that point, both parties agreed that Adams 
should leave the residence. 182 
When Ms. Hess told Carlene that Adams was leaving the home, she 
responded by telling her mother, "good, he has been messing with 
me."
183 Ms. Hess waited until Mr. Adams had removed all of his belong-
ings from the home before she reported the sexual abuse to the police 
and an intensive investigation began. Adams was subsequently charged 
with one count of rape and another of forcible sexual abuse. At trial, Car-
lene testified that she had been molested by Adams even though oppos-
ing counsel attempted to suggest that the allegations had been invented 
and that Carlene's story was coached in order to achieve retaliation for 
what was effectively a lover's quarre1. 184 
As part of its case, the State of Utah took testimony from Detective 
DeHart who stated that he was "unable to lead Carlene with his questions 
and that, in his opinion, she did not appear to be coached." 185 He further 
testified that the young woman's account of the molestation appeared to 
be consistent with her subsequent description of the events, and he, 
180. 5 P.3d at 642. 
181. See id. at 643. 
182. See id. at 644. 
183. !d. at 644. 
184. See id. 
185. !d. at 644. 
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therefore, had no reason to disbelieve the account. 186 The prosecution 
also called Dr. Hawks, a psychologist, who had evaluated Carlene's gen-
eral cognitive abilities and whose purpose was to testify that it was not 
likely that Carlene could be coached in order to tell a trumped up story, 
nor was she sophisticated enough to contrive it up on her own accord. 187 
Based on the foregoing evidence, a jury acquitted Adams of rape but 
found him guilty of forcible sexual abuse. 188 Adams appealed the jury re-
sult arguing that there had not been a proper foundation for Dr. Hawks's 
testimony that Carlene was not capable of being coached. This argument 
was summarily dismissed by the Utah Court of Appeals, but the court did 
agree that Detective DeHart's testimony violated Rule 608(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence (URE). 189 This rule deals with opinion testimony as to 
character or truthfulness, and the appellate court held that admission was 
really harmless error given the preponderance of other evidence to sup-
port the trial court's finding. 190 Most importantly, the court of appeals 
ruled that Dr. Hawks's testimony satisfied the foundational requirements 
for admitting scientific testimony established in State v. Rimmasch, 191 a 
base line precedent in Utah guiding the admissibility of such evidence. 
Adams sought review of the court of appeals decision and certiorari was 
granted. 192 
The Utah Supreme Court ruled that Dr. Hawks's testimony did not 
violate Rule 608(a) of the URE since the rule permits testimony dealing 
with a witness' general character or reputation for truthfulness. 193 It only 
prohibits testimony as to the truthfulness of a witness on a particular oc-
casion.194 As a result, the admissibility of Dr. Hawks's testimony had to 
be reviewed with regard to whether Carlene could possibly have been 
coached. The court found an answer to this question in the trial tran-
186. See id. 
187. See Adams, 5 P.3d at 644. 
188. See id. 
189. See id. at 648. The court based its decision as to this expert's testimony on the fact that 
"he did not offer a direct opinion of Carlene's truthfulness about the alleged sexual abuse." /d. at 
646. The rationale for this conclusion emanated from the nature of his testimony. He testified as to 
her lack of sophistication relative to the ability to be coached to tell a false story. See id. The court 
also held Dr. Hawks's testimony properly admitted under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
but based upon a different rationale. Since the expert's testimony was not delving into "new or novel 
scientific principles or techniques," the Rimmasch test did not apply. Accordingly, Rule 702 parame-
ters were not violated. /d. at 646-47. As to Detective DeHart's testimony, there was ample "other 
persuasive evidence" to support the conviction, making this harmless error. /d. at 647-48. 
190. See id. 
191. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). 
192. See Adams, 5 P.3d at 644. 
193. See id. at 645-46. 
194. See id. 
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script. 195 The court reviewed the testimony and concluded that Dr. 
Hawks's testimony did not violate rule 608(a) since it was merely his 
opinion that she did not have the cognitive ability to be coached. This 
was not a question of truthfulness. 196 Dr. Hawks had testified that it was 
"probably not likely that the victim had been coached or that she was so-
phisticated enough to make such allegations at trial,"197 but the expert 
witness did not offer any direct opinions regarding the victim's truthful-
ness about the alleged sexual abuse! 98 His comments were confined to 
Carlene's mental capacity regarding the ability to effectively establish 
and repeat a fabricated story!99 
This type of differential analysis was very much in concert with the 
spirit of the Daubert case--despite the fact that the Utah Supreme Court 
did not mention this-as URE 702 is virtually the mirror image of its 
federal counterpart.200 Most importantly, the court held that Rule 608(a) 
does not prevent an expert like Dr. Hawks from giving differential diag-
nosis in court from which a jury could infer the truthfulness of the wit-
ness.201 Instead, the rule bars direct testimony as to truthfulness. As are-
sult, Dr. Hawks did not improperly offer any evidence relative to 
Carlene's veracity on any occasion, and his testimony did not violate the 
appropriate Utah Rules of Evidence.202 
As to the foundation issue with regard to Dr. Hawks's testimony, the 
court did not fall into the trap of requiring substantial scientific data and 
published peer review documents in order to find probative or substantial 
value in his differential diagnosis.203 The court found that he "properly 
applied the scientific principles to the facts" and that "the probative value 
of [his] testimony outweighed its potential for prejudice."204 Conse-
quently, although the Utah Supreme Court upheld the Utah Court of Ap-
peals conclusion with regard to this issue, it did state that the lower ap-
pellate court's reliance on the Rimmasch case was misplaced.205 
The final inquiry relative to Dr. Hawks's testimony is the question of 
admissibility relative to the general rule of expert testimony admission. 
This is covered in URE 702 and provides that "if scientific, technical, or 
195. See id. 
196. See Adams, 5 P.3d at 645-46. 
197. /d. at 646. 
198. See id. 
199. See id. 
200. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-94. 
201. See Adams, 5 P.3d at 646. 
202. See id. 
203. See id. 
204. /d. at 646. 
205. See id. 
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specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine the fact in issue, a witness qualifies as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise."206 Since Dr. Hawks had specialized 
knowledge that would provide assistance to the finder of fact, his opinion 
was certainly relevant.207 Further, he was a designated mental retardation 
expert with extensive experience with victims of alleged sexual abuse. 
The trial court did not err with regard to allowing Dr. Hawks's testimony 
relative to its overall discretion since Dr. Hawks's testimony was not 
based on any new or novel theories.208 
B. State v. Kelley 
In another Utah case factually similar to and decided just three days 
prior to Adams, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of De-
fendant Allen Kelley for attempted rape.209 During trial, evidence was 
introduced showing that the victim was staying with her brother over the 
December 1997 Christmas holiday period.210 She was not capable of liv-
ing alone and needed assistance even for the simplest of daily tasks. De-
fendant Kelley was staying with the victim's brother during the refer-
enced December 1997 period, having moved there following marital 
difficulties.211 On December 26, 1997, Kelley entered the victim's room, 
undressed her, and attempted to initiate sexual intercourse with her. They 
were interrupted by the victim's sister who entered the home to pick her 
up according to a preestablished appointment.212 The sister found the vic-
tim naked from the waist down and the defendant ran out fully naked.213 
The sister helped dress the girl, removed her from the house, and called 
the police.214 At trial, Kelley was convicted and testified that he was 
aware that the victim was "mentally retarded to some extent."215 
Four months prior to the trial, the government provided notice that 
Ronald J. Wright, a mental retardation expert, would be called as a wit-
ness.216 Wright was also the director of the victim's residential home.217 
206. Adams, 5 P.3d at 647. 
207. See id. 
208. See id. 
209. Kelley, I P.3d at 546. 
210. See id. at 548. 
211. See id. 
212. See id. 
213. See id. 
214. See id. 
215. !d. 
216. See id. 
217. See id. 
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Kelley's counsel failed to file a motion in limine or any other objection 
challenging Wright's credentials or experience as an expert until four 
days prior to the trial.218 As the residential director of the victim's home, 
his testimony was sought for no other significant purpose than to com-
ment on her mental state. However, this catapulted him into the category 
of an expert witness who could do considerable harm to the defendant's 
case. At trial, oral argument was heard regarding the admissibility of 
Wright's testimony. The judge ruled that if the prosecutor could lay a 
proper foundation, the expert would be permitted to testify.219 Wright tes-
tified that despite the fact the victim had the body of an adult, "she did 
not have the mental capacity to consent to, or understand the conse-
f l "220 H d . 11· . quences o , a sexua act. e use mte tgence quotient test scores, 
mental age assessment, and his experience as a special education teacher 
to reach his conclusion.221 Kelley sought an appeal objecting to the ad-
mission of Wright's testimony222 and to the ineffective assistance of 
counsel due to the failure to file timely motions in his case.223 
Again, the key question was the admissibility of Wright's testimony 
as an expert pursuant to URE 702. As noted by the Utah Supreme Court, 
"[t]he critical factor in determining the competency of an expert is 
whether that expert has knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in re-
solving the issues before it."224 The court focused on Wright's twenty-
seven years as a trained professional and his degree in special education 
from Brigham Young University.225 His experience was extensive in 
working with other professionals in determining the intellectual capabili-
ties of disabled individuals.226 Not too surprisingly, the defendant ob-
jected to the fact that Wright was not licensed to diagnose mental retar-
dation and alleged that this disqualified him from testifying as to the 
victim's cognitive abilities.227 Similar charges were levied against his 
218. See Kelley, I P.3d at 548. 
219. See id. 
220. /d. at 549. 
221. See id. 
222. See id. 
223. See id. at 549, 551-52. The Utah Supreme Court followed the precedent established by 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) that any ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
must be buttressed by evidence in a demonstrable manner that his or her "performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable judgment and, second. that counsel's performnnce prejudiced the 
defendant." /d. (emphasis added); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994) (quoting Bundy 
v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988)). Since the evidence of Mr. Wright did not violate either 
of these requirements, it was properly admitted. See Kelley, I P.3d at 552. 
224. /d. at 549. See Patey v. Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1999). 
225. See Kelley, I P.3d at 549. 
226. See id. at 549-50. 
227. See id. at 550. 
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qualifications to administer an intelligence quotient (IQ) test.228 The 
court dispensed with these arguments in a fashion similar to that used in 
the Adams case.229 First, "licensing in and of itself is not dispositive of an 
expert's qualifications to offer an opinion."230 Secondly, "Wright's train-
ing and experience were sufficient for the trial court to have found him 
qualified to give expert testimony on the victim's competency."231 For 
these reasons, URE 702 was not violated by the introduction of this ex-
pert's scientific and opinion testimony. 232 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The most recent contributions in this controversy are those made by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Kelley and Adams. Not surprisingly, the Utah 
Supreme Court chose to accept the prevalent view, as set forth in 
Daubert, that flexibility and relevance supersede the strictures of the sci-
entific community. This was done despite the fact that Daubert was not 
cited or even mentioned in these state cases. In Kelley and Adams, defer-
ence was given to scientific methodology but not at the expense of rob-
bing the trier of fact of reasonable, relevant, and potentially decisive evi-
dence. 
This is the prudent approach enunciated clearly in Daubert. The fact 
that the Utah Supreme Court did not reference Daubert in its recent hold-
ings may indicate the development of admissibility criteria that are, per-
haps, even more forgiving than the Daubert criteria. The idea that the 
trier of fact would be shielded from scientific evidence simply because it 
is not vetted in a manner comparable to methodologies generally ac-
cepted in the legal community is not acceptable. A more flexible ap-
proach is necessary to maintain the good order of evidence introduction 
and availability, especially in cases that rest on the opinion of differential 
diagnoses offered by experienced physicians. As noted by one expert on 
law and psychiatry, and as implied throughout the Utah opinions, experi-
ence does count for something.233 
228. See id. 
229. See Kelley, I P.3d at 550-51. 
230. /d. at 550. The court went on to state, "[w]e have routinely allowed persons to testify as 
experts based on the totality of their qualifications and experience, and not on licensing or formal 
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